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Tr N HIS LONG-STANDING LEGAL CAREER, Professor Leslie C. Green has al~

II ways shown a very personal interest in new topics and developments, in
particular with regard to European affairs. The following considerations on cur~
rent legal issues surrounding multinational military units are, therefore, con~
tributed to this volume, published in his honor. Multinational military units
may lend a new quality to the European unification process by helping make it
irreversible in the fields of security and defense. This process may contribute to
the continuity and predictability of international relations. It will.promote a
common security and defense identity which in a very distinct way may in~
crease the security of the nations involved. Although such trends are still
unique, even in Europe today, they might well prove significant beyond the
North Atlantic Alliance in the years to come.
Multinational military units can facilitate modernization despite dwindling
resources. Due to force and budget reductions in certain participating coun~
tries, there have already been several cases of major formations no longer being
sustainable on a national scale. Multinationality ensures the States concerned
continue participating in military operations at corps level. What matters
more, however, is a new chance to deepen cooperation within the Alliance and
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further develop mutual understanding of the daily interests and requirements
of the Allies.
Multinational military units are characterized by military~to~military coordi~
nation between States. They are not entities with a corporate, political element
of their own, nor do they enjoy an independent status distinct from the contrib~
uting States. Nevertheless, they tend to mark the beginning of a trend in the
larger context of overall European security.
The present study begins by describing existing agreements concerning mul~
tinational military units. It then turns to the right of presence of military con~
tingents in a foreign host State, provisions relating to the status of the military
and civilian personnel involved, and issues of command and control. Finally,
some conclusions will be drawn on the relevance of the concept of multina~
tional military units for further activities within the Alliance and beyond.
Present Agreements on Multinational Units
The concept of multinationality manifests itself especially clearly in the Ger~
man Bundeswehr. For several decades, the German Air Force has increasingly
developed multinational cooperation, a fact reflected in its daily training pro~
grams, doctrine, and Alliance integration. Much of the Air Force (fighter
wings, surface~to~air missile units, and air combat operations centers) is already
subordinate to NATO commanders in peacetime, receiving operation orders
from the integrated NATO structure on the basis of NATO operation plans.
The German Navy permanently contributes two destroyers or frigates, as well
as a mine countermeasures unit, to NATO's Standing Naval Forces. The high~
est degree of multinationalization has been reached in the German Army.
With <;mly one exception (IVth Corps, with headquarters in Potsdam), all of its
major formations are multinational today.
In the German case, three different models of multinational units have been
developed simultaneously. First, two German/U.S. corps follow the so~called
lead nation model, with the U.S. and Germany taking turns performing com~
mand functions and occupying key positions. The second, or framework model,
is illustrated by the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Rapid Reaction Corps, in
which the British Forces provide the framework, i.e., command, control, ad~
ministration, and logistic support of the headquarters, and define procedures.
By contrast, the framework is provided by the Bundeswehr for the Reaction
Force Air Staff based in Kalkar. The Danish~German Corps LANDJUT was
the first formation to be organized according to the third model, deepening
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integration. The German,Netherlands Corps and the European Corps have pro'
vided an opportunity to further develop and deepen the integration model.
The German,Netherlands Corps, with its headquarters in Muenster,
Westphalia, is the first example of a multinational unit with forces of each par,
ticipating State stationed on the territory of the partner State. This Corps com,
prises German main defense forces (1st Armored Division/Military District
Command II in Hanover) and the major part of the Netherlands Army, i.e., the
1st (NL) Division "7 December," the 41st Light Brigade which has been sta,
tioned in Seedorf (Lower Saxony) for decades. The binational Command Sup,
port Group (CSG), which includes more than 1,400 German military and
civilian personnel, is stationed in Eibergen (Netherlands). In a joint declara,
tion dated October 6, 1997, the respective Ministers of Defense designated the
Corps Headquarters in Muenster as a Force Answerable to Western European
Union (FAWEU). Moreover, the Convention on the German,Netherlands
Corps, signed on October 6, 1997, 1 has been submitted to parliaments in Ger,
many and in the Netherlands for approval. The Headquarters has been given
legal authority to contract, hire civilian personnel, and pay claims, all from a
multinational Corps budget and on behalf of the two participating States. Prop,
erty acquired with common funds is to be considered as owned in common by
the Federal Republic of Germany and the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Em,
ployment contracts of civilians hired to work at the Headquarters in Muenster
are governed by German labor and social law.
The European Corps (Eurocorps), headquartered in Strasbourg, France,
consists of personnel from five nations (Belgium, France, Germany, Luxem,
bourg and Spain). It attained operational readiness on November 30, 1995.
One of its core elements is the Franco,German Brigade, which has existed
since 1988 and which, in part, is integrated down to the company level. Belgian
and French military elements2 of the Eurocorps are stationed in Germany; their
status is determined by the NATO SOFA3 and the Supplementary Agreement
to the NATO SOFA with respect to foreign forces stationed in Germany.4 A
January 21, 1993 agreement with Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
(SACEUR Agreement) defines the special terms of the employment of the
Corps within the framework of the North Atlantic Alliance. By it, the Corps
will serve as part of the main defense and reaction forces on the basis of opera'
tion plans prepared under the auspices ofSACEUR. In any case, the participat,
ing nations will remain responsible for deciding on the employment of the
Corps. The status of the headquarters in Strasbourg and of the formations op,
erating jointly on the territories of each participating State are yet to be de,
fined. To this end, a "Strasbourg Convention" is currently being negotiated to
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establish the legal personality of the headquarters and describe the mission of
the Corps. This agreement will be subject to approval by the parliaments of the
participating States.
For other multinational Units, stationing issues are ofless significance. The
LANDJUT Corps had been based in the area of Jutland/Schleswig~Holstein
since 1962, with the existing NATO headquarters of the Allied Land Forces
Schleswig~ Holstein and Jutland (HQ LANDJUT) in Rendsburg being used for
command and control. HQ LANDJUT was supported by one headquarters
company and one Danish and one German signal battalion. It exercises opera~
tional command over German and Danish units which remain national units
deployed in their home countries, but which cooperate closely during exer~
cises. HQ LANDJUT was disbanded in Spring 1999 following introduction of
the new NATO command structure. However, close Danish~German army co~
operation will continue together with a new ally, Poland, in the Multinational
Corps Northeast. This formation was activated in September 1999, after Po~
land's accession to the North Atlantic Treaty. To this end, the Ministers ofDe~
fense of Denmark, Germany and Poland signed a Declaration oflntent and an
agreement on initial preparations for the establishment of the trinational head~
quarters in Szczecin in March 1998. The Danish Division and the 14th (GE)
Mechanized Infantry Division (Neubrandenburg) will continue to cooperate as
they did in the LANDJUT Corps and be reinforced by the 12th (PL) Division as
a new and equal partner. Permanent deployment in foreign countries will be re~
stricted to the Danish and German elements of the Corps Headquarters based
in Szczecin. As requested by the Parties involved, Danish~German~Polish ne~
gotiations on the Corps have been conducted under German chairmanship.
The experience gained in Muenster and Strasbourg could thus be utilized for
the new trilateral corps. On September 5, 1998, the Corps Convention5 was
signed in Szczecin following parliamentary approval in Denmark, Germany,
and Poland. It entered into force in October 1999.
Possible tasks and missions of multinational units were considered in Ger~
many against the backdrop of the constitutional discussion on Bundeswehr
participation in out~of~area operations, which led to the Federal Constitutional
Court's decision of 1994.6 It is obvious that the armed forces are not only possi~
ble tools of collective defense in accordance with Article 5 of the North Atlan~
tic Treaty and Article V of the Western European Union (WEU) Treaty, but
must also be designated for multinational crisis management tasks under the
auspices of the United Nations, NATO, or WEU or on the basis of regional
agreements in accordance with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. In addition,
they serve to plan, prepare and execute humanitarian aid activities and rescue
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operations, including disaster relief. It is in this context that the appropriate authorities of each participating State have to decide on missions within the
scope of their national constitutions and in accordance with the provisions of
the Charter of the United Nations.
The Eurocorps is fully available for each of the three basic mission types. In
peacetime, only main defense forces are assigned to the German-Netherlands
Corps on the German side. This, however, does not preclude crisis reaction
forces of the Bundeswehr from being assigned also to the Corps for specific missions. The fact that the Corps Headquarters has been designated FAWEU underlines the interest that both sides have in the capability to jointly accomplish
this part of the spectrum of tasks as well. Similar arrangements are being considered for the Multinational Corps Northeast, even though the 14th (GE)
Mechanized Infantry Division forms part of the German Army's main defense
forces.
Other multinational units in Europe (to which the Bundeswehr does not
contribute) also demonstrate the attractiveness of the integration model far beyond the German borders. For many years, the United KingdomlNetherlands
Amphibious Force has developed close and effective cooperation in accordance with NATO plans and national commitments. The European Rapid Operational Force (EUROFOR), with its headquarters in Verona, Italy, comprises
personnel from France, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, although an agreement on
the formation remains to be concluded. The same Parties also created a
non-standing naval force, EUROMARFOR, which has no permanent headquarters of its own. EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR are designed to operate
in missions laid down in the Petersberg Declaration of the Ministerial Meeting
of the Western European Union of 19 June 1992,7 namely humanitarian missions or evacuation of nationals, peacekeeping missions, and combat force missions for crisis management, including peace-enforcement missions. They will
support the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) and are open for
participation by other European forces. Under UN auspices, the Standby High
Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) has been established with headquarters in
Birkerod, Denmark. Multinational Land Forces (MLF) in brigade strength are
planned by Italy, Hungary, and Slovenia, with Italy taking a lead. The Central
European Nations Cooperation in Peace Support (CENCOOP) is being developed by five partner States (Austria, Hungary, Romania, Slovak Republic, and
Slovenia) and two observers (Czech Republic and Switzerland). A Letter ofIntent was signed by the five participating ministers of defence on March 19,
1998. The tasks and mission ofCENCOOP are to improve peacekeeping capabilities and achieve a higher profile through regional cooperation based on
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complexity, multifunctionality, non, traditional tasks, multinationality within
contingents, interoperability, interlocking components, as well as role special,
ization, readiness, mobility, rapid and flexible reaction and mission tailoring ac,
cording to the mandate. Finally, the Baltic Battalion (BALTBAIT) and the
Baltic Naval Squadron (BALTRON) have proven their usefulness for many
different operations, while a Hungarian,Romanian Battery and other multina,
tional military units are planned to assume specific tasks in the near future.
Agreements Concerning the Right of Presence
The permanent or temporary presence of foreign forces (ius ad praesentiam)
is subject to approval by the receiving State in accordance with its national
laws and practice. In Germany, the right to permanently station allied forces is
based on a State treaty, the 1954 Convention on the Presence of Foreign
Forces.8 This right is not restricted to tasks to be accomplished in the context
of collective defense pursuant to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. In'
stead, the purpose of stationing is defined in more general terms in the Pream,
ble to the 1954 Convention: "In view of the present international situation and the
need to ensure the defense of the free world". In the past, this was related to defen,
sive action as provided for in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty (commit,
ment to provide assistance "if an armed attack against one or more of the Parties in
Europe or North America occurs") and in Article V of the Brussels Treaty on the
Western European Union-("If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the
object of an armed attack in Europe"). However, activities of allied armed forces
in the context of crisis management and humanitarian assistance, as they form
part of the common objectives of multinational units today, are not precluded
by the text of the 1954 Convention. In this regard, note that the Convention
was explicitly confirmed by an Exchange of Notes dated 25 September 1990,9
and that the preambular reference to "the present international situation and the
need to ensure the defense of the free world" was not altered in 1990. Thus, it is
subject to continuous political evaluation. In German State practice, such activi,
ties have always required special consent of the Federal Government.
Similar conventional provisions apply to the German forces stationed in the
Netherlands as part of the German,Netherlands Corps. The new 1997 treaty
on the stationing of German armed forces in the Netherlands, 10 which updates
a previous German,Netherlands agreement of 1963 and which takes the 1954
Convention into account, covers all possible purposes of stationing, although
set purposes are subject to mutual agreement between the two governments.
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As far as additional allied armed forces temporarily stationed in Germany
within the framework of multinational units for the purpose of combined exer~
cises, the legal situation is rather complex. While there is no doubt that even
temporary presence requires special consent of the Federal Government, the
question of whether and to what extent such consent has to be based on parlia~
mentary approval has been a matter of discussion. Some experts demanded
such approval without clearly defining the scope of the Government's execu~
tive powers, which are of special importance with regard to forces of a foreign
power on German territory. The German Visiting Forces Act of 1995 11 ended
this debate by requiring the conclusion of agreements with sending States.
Such agreements may be put into force in Germany by executive order under
the Visiting Forces Act; specific parliamentary approval is not required. Note
that formal agreements are required on the entry into and temporary stay in the
Federal Republic of Germany of foreign armed forces "for the purpose of exer~
cises, transit by land or training of units". Below this threshold, manifold forms of
military cooperation are possible and are, indeed, daily routine today, but they
.
do not require the conclusion of formal agreements.
German unification necessitated specific provisions concerning the station~
ing of foreign troops, for the territorial application of the 1954 Convention is
restricted to Western Germany. Specifically, according to Article 11 (in con~
junction with Chapter 1 Section I of Annex I) of the Treaty on German
Unity,12 neither the 1954 Convention or the NATO SOFA and Supplemen~
tary Agreement apply to Berlin or the former German Democratic Republic. In
order to permit allied forces that are permanently stationed in Germany13 to
temporarily visit the Eastern part of the country, it was agreed in a 25 Septem~
ber 1990 Exchange of Notes 14 that any official activity requires consent of the
Federal Government in compliance with the provisions of Article 5 paragraph
3 of the Two~plus~Four Treaty.l5
An agreement regarding temporary visits by other allied forces was con~
cluded by an Exchange of Notes on April 29, 1998. 16 It creates a legal situation
with the six permanent sending States comparable to the above~mentioned Ex~
change of Notes of September 25, 1990. New NATO member States may also
be invited to accede to it. It will be submitted for approval to the newly elected
14th German Bundestag. Approval by the other participating States is being
pursued according to their national requirements.
Before long, bilateral agreements will be concluded with the Polish and
Czech governments covering reciprocal arrangements for the mutual presence
of forces of the Bundeswehr and Polish and Czech forces in each of the partici~
pating States. They can be put into force in Germany by statutory order in
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accordance with the Visiting Forces Act I7 and the Act concerning the Part~
nership for Peace (PfP) SOFA.I8 Similar visiting forces agreements are pro~
posed for all new partners to the Alliance.
The Status of Personnel
The status (ius in praesentia) of military and civilian personnel of multina~
tional units is complex because the provisions of international law apply to the
status of foreigners, but not to nationals of the host State. Although the NATO
SOFA of 1951 extends to all NATO members, and to the new partners of the
Alliance through the PfP SOFA of 1995, it mainly contains rather general reg~
ulations. Indeed, the preamble of the NATO SOFA contemplates the possibil~
ity of separate arrangements between the Parties concerned "in so far as such
conditions are not laid down by the present Agreement." In many cases there is a
need to supplement the NATO SOFA provisions; varying interests have led to
quite different arrangements during the five decades of close cooperation
within the Alliance.
Article IV of the PfP SOFA provides for the possibility of supplementing or
otherwise modifying it in accordance with international law. For such modifica~
tion, the rules codified in Article 41 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties I9 are relevant. By application of that article, Parties to the PfP SOFA
may modify it only as between themselves alone and subject to the following
conditions: the modification in question must not be prohibited by the PfP
SOFA; it must not affect the enjoyment by the other Parties of their rights un~
der the PfP SOFA or the performance of their obligations; it must not relate to
a provision, derogation of which is incompatible with the effective execution of
the object and purpose of the PfP SOFA as a whole; and the Parties in question
shall notify the other Parties of their intention to conclude the agreement and
of the modification to the PfP SOFA for which it provides. Thus, the scope
of possible modifications is clearly limited. Experience gathered so far in the im~
plementation of the PfP program establishes that modifications of PfP SOFA
rules are neither intended nor required under existing supplementing agree~
ments. There is, indeed, a widely shared interest in avoiding modifications
altogether.
Cooperation within multinational units may contribute to increased interest
in the reciprocity of such separate arrangements. In this context, the Nether~
lands deserve special credit because, in 1997, they were the first Ally to con~
clude a Supplementary Agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany,20
which defines the rights and duties of Bundeswehr personnel stationed in the
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Netherlands in provisions which are fully congruent with the Supplementary
Agreement regarding the status of forces permanently stationed in Germany.21
Special tribute is also to be paid to the Czech and Polish negotiators who de~
manded full reciprocity from the beginning of the negotiations on agreements
in accordance with the German Visiting Forces Act. In doing so, they effec~
tively contributed to uniform standards, for as a national law, the German
Visiting Forces Act had to be limited to the status of foreign forces in
Germany.
In addition to the provisions relating to the status of forces of a sending
State, special rules have to be established on the status of multinational head~
quarters. An exception was the LANDJUT Corps, because it was commanded
by an existing NATO headquarters, the status of which ensued from the Paris
Protocol of 1952 22 and the 1967 Agreement regarding NATO headquarters in
Germany.23 By contrast, the Danish~German~Polish Convention of 5 Septem~
ber 1998 on the Multinational Corps Northeast24 provided for specific States
rules due to the fact their application of the Paris Protocol, either mutatis mu~
tandis or under its Article 14, was excluded for political and legal reasons. By
Article 14, the whole or any part of the Paris Protocol may be applied, by deci~
sion of the North Atlantic Council, to any international military headquarters
or organization established pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty. The Head~
quarters of the Multinational Corps Northeast in Szczecin, however, is not part
of the NATO command structure. Reference to the Paris Protocol on NATO
Headquarters could have resulted in a misunderstanding in this respect which
would not have been without political implications. As confirmed in Part IV of
the NATO~ Russia Founding Act,25 in the current and foreseeable security en~
vironment, the Alliance will carry out its collective defense and other missions
by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for rein~
forcement rather than by additional stationing of permanent substantial com~
bat forces. Even if provisions of the Paris Protocol had been used, major
adaptations would have been necessary considering the fact that the Multina~
tional Corps Northeast is subordinated only to the three ministers of defense;
therefore, the rights and responsibilities of NATO as defined in the Paris Pro~
tocol are inapplicable. Consequently, the Multinational Corps Northeast de~
rives no juridical personality from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as
defined in Article 10 of the Paris Protocol. Its authority is vested exclusively by
the three participating States. Property of the Headquarters of the Multina~
tiona I Corps Northeast is that of the States and only participating States may
be committed in legal proceedings. Finally, the North Atlantic Council will not
be involved in the settlement of possible disputes, which will remain the
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exclusive responsibility of the Parties under the Convention. These adaptations go far beyond what is normally considered as an application mutatis mutandis. 26 Hence, no precedent was established by the Paris Protocol. As far as
relevant, however, experience and common practice deriving from the application of certain Paris Protocol provisions may be useful for interpretation
purposes.
Unlike NATO headquarters that do not act on behalf of specific States but
on behalf of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the headquarters of multinational units generally do not require a legal personality of their own, for participating States remain the subjects of all rights and duties. The States own all
real property and equipment, either individually or jointly. The fact that military and civilian personnel remain under national command does not, however, preclude combined headquarters from concluding certain support
services contracts payable from the joint budget. Doing so requires an agreement on contractual competence because the contracts are concluded on behalf of the participating States.
Article 8 of the Convention on the German-Netherlands Corps provides for
this solution. According to the German constitution, the authority to conclude
contracts and perform other administrative functions is exercised by agencies
of the defense admirristratiqn, not the armed forces. 27 A strict separation of the
armed forces and the defense administration may, however, cause friction in
multinational units, especially if the partners provide for differing distribution
of responsibilities, as might be the case if budget commissioner functions are
performed by a division of the Corps headquarters headed by a foreign officer.
It is of particular importance for the Eurocorps that development of a WEU
Status of Forces Agreement has been included in the effort to produce a
NATO/WEU framework document. The necessity and urgency of such an
agreement on the status of troops and personnel placed under WEU command
remains unsettled. Among others, the following factors bear on this issue:
deepening relations between the WEU and NATO, with priority being given
to the implementation of the pertinent resolutions passed during summit conferences and ministerial meetings; increased integration of Associated Partners, specifically in military cooperation within the WEU; and the common
aim to strengthen the WED's capabilities, particularly with regard to the role
and efficiency of the WED's military bodies. To foster uniformity during combined operations, the status of the troops and personnel placed under WEU
command should largely be patterned on the provisions of the NATO SOFA.
Moreover, the compatibility of new solutions with European Union (EU) law
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must be ensured. This applies specifically to EU law dealing with the exemption
of foreign armed forces and their members from taxes and other duties. 28
Command and Control
Given legal constraints as well as policy concerns which for most of the par~
ticipating States would exclude transfer of full command to an officer of allied
forces, it is essential to clearly define command and control issues for multina~
tional units.
Within NATO, rules and procedures for integrated assignment are well es~
tablished.2 9 They denote the relationship between a soldier assigned to a
NATO headquarters or agency and the person heading that headquarters or
agency. Generally speaking, this relationship involves all matters concerning
the soldier, with the exception of personal (in particular disciplinary) matters
and personnel service support (which in principle remains a national
responsibility) .
The established terms of command relationship between NATO command~
ers and the national units apply both in peacetime and in wartime. NATO
commanders exercise authority pursuant to the Resolution Implementing Sec~
tion IV of the Final Act of the London Conference of 23 October 1954.30 This
authority is amplified in the Terms of Reference of the Major NATO Com~
manders and further agreements. In these documents, the different levels of
command and control-Tactical Control (TACON),31 Tactical Command
(TACOM),32 Operational Control (OPCON)33 up to Operational Command
(OPCOM)34-are well established. As specified for each particular case, they
may be exercised either permanently or on an ad hoc basis. Although extensive
Coordinating Authority35 is vested in the NATO commander, Full Command,36 remains under national authority. It follows that the term "com~
mand," as used internationally, implies a lesser degree of authority than in a
purely national sense. No NATO commander has full command over the
forces assigned to him. Instead, nations, when assigning forces to NATO, dele~
gate only operational command or operational control. In multinational opera~
tions, each participating nation will normally be represented by a national
commander responsible for ensuring that full command can be exercised and
that respective national law and policies are observed. Given this situation, an
appropriate means for facilitating close cooperation at the international level
are common rules of engagement; they are critical for effective command and
control of an operation.

171

Legal Issues of Multinational Military Units
Likewise, the relationship between a national unit and the competent
NATO commander has to be considered. An elaborate system ofNATO Ear~
marked Forces,37 NATO Assigned Forces38 and NATO Command Forces 39
allows for reasonable planning security. It should, however, also be borne in
mind that any Transfer of Authority (ToA) remains subject to national deci~
sion in accordance with national procedures of the country concerned. Addi~
tionally, national forces so earmarked, assigned, or even placed under
operational command or control may be withdrawn by national decision.
Of particular import for Germany is the question of the scope of command
which the Federal Minister of Defense has over German military personnel in
accordance with Article 65a of the German Constitu tion. 40 Despite the article,
German subordinates may be ordered by their national superiors to obey the in~
structions of a foreign directing authority. Disobedience of the foreign supe~
rior's instructions would be a disciplinary offence against the duty to serve
10yally.41 The practical consequence of this legal construction is that German
soldiers have to fully comply with directives issued by an allied commander as if
these directives were military orders strictu sensu. Non~compliance may be
sanctioned by the competent national commander under the Military Disci~
plinary Code. 42 However, penal sanctions are not allowed because, pursuant to
the Military Penal Code,43 disobedience requires a military order strictu sensu.
In the case of the guard duties in the German~Netherlands Corps, these con~
siderations led to an express provision in the Corps Convention stating that
binationally used facilities may be guarded by binational guards, if sending
State guard personnel are vested with the same authority as guard personnel of
the receiving State. For the execution of their duties, binational guards are ex~
clusively subordinated to the competent superior guard authorities of the re~
ceiving State. 44 The German national guard provisions have been amended
accordingly to include allied soldiers in German military guards. 45 For bina~
tional guard duties outside the territory of the Contracting Parties, specific ar~
rangements will be necessary.
Unless otherwise provided, the command relationship between NATO
commanders and national units also applies to the relationship between com~
manders of multinational units and their national contingents. In the case of
the German~Netherlands Corps, a first step towards deepening command and
control integration was the agreement on Integrated Directing and Control
Authority under Article 6 of the Corps Convention.46 As understood by the
Contracting Parties, the Commander of the Corps' authority with regard to the
execution of tasks given to the Corps goes beyond Operational Command. Pur~
suant to Article 7 paragraph 4 of the detailed Corps Agreement,47 Integrated
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Directing and Control Authority enables the Corps Commander to take full re,
sponsibility for the implementation of all Corps directives. Accordingly, he may
issue and prioritize directives to the binational and national elements of the
Corps when necessary, with the exception of national territorial tasks. The
commander may delegate this authority to the extent required to subordinate
commanders. Unanimity of all Parties is essential for this solution; a majority
decision will not suffice. Moreover, it must be ensured that national contin,
gents (and single soldiers) are recallable at any time through national orders.
National rights and private duties, specifically with regard to disciplinary mat'
ters and complaints, are still exempt. Further steps towards full command and
control will, thus, remain subject to continued consideration.
A reevaluation of the relevant German legal doctrine48 has led to an influ,
ential academic opinion that, without prejudice to the power of command of
the Minister of Defense under Article 65a of the Basic Law, foreign command,
ers in multinational military units may be included in the chain of command
under German military law as long as unanimity exists between all ministers of
defense concerned. This opinion is based on the understanding that directives
issued at the multinational level in fact represent national directives tied up in
joint responsibility. Hence, so long as directives issued by a multinational min,
isterial committee to the commander of a multinational unit are executed by
the latter with respect to the national contingents, these directives represent
national directives to the respective national contingent. There are, however,
contrary opinions which question the compatibility between the political and
military interest in full power of command of the integrated commander and
existing German legal requirements. 49 To date, no legislative solution to this
controversy has been reached.
Outside the Alliance, NATO terms and definitions do not apply unless spe,
cifically agreed. Nevertheless, the legal issues discussed here in the context of
multinational military units resurface when national contingents of various
States are tasked to cooperate in joint missions. Clear provisions should, there,
fore, be negotiated and enacted well in advance of such operations.
For peacekeeping operations under United Nations command and control,
standardized rules should be possible. Unfortunately, existing UN practice ap,
pears to be less than precise in this respect. A general provision was prepared in
the 1991 Model Agreement on troop contribution. 50 Yet, the term "command"
is not clearly defined in this document. Interpretations of the term "full author,
ity over the deployment, organization, conduct and direction," which, accord,
ing to this Model Agreement, shall be exercised exclusively by the
Secrerary,General, may also differ. So far, the Model Agreement has not been
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widely used in UN peacekeeping. For the mission in the former Yugoslavia, it
was essential to secure NATO's support under the Dayton Accords. Thus,
clear terms of command and control could be used and implemented as dis,
cussed above.

A

s illustrated in this study, multinational military units are of unique
significance for application of the ius ad praesentiam as well as the sta,
tus of forces (ius in praesentia) regime and its further development. In specific
cases, the establishment of such units has revealed the need for certain adjust,
ments to promote the principle of reciprocity.
Command and control issues within multinational units and the relation,
ship between foreign, "multinational" commanders and national authorities of
the participating States need further consideration. New forms of integrated
command and control relations may be required in the process of deepening in,
tegration. The degree to which NATO terms of command and control could be
used as guidance, or even be made applicable to operations outside the Alli,
ance, merits further investigation.
Proposals to harmonize national military laws in support of daily cooperation
in multinational units raise questions regarding possible deviations from exist,
ing national laws. Such questions cannot be properly answered in general
terms, but instead require specific solutions responsive to the respective con,
text. Changes in national legislation may only be executed step by step and as
part of an overall process of development.
Increased integration should not be regarded as an end in itself. It remains
equally important to ensure the exchangeability of personnel between various
units with regard to their participation in multinational units. This sets certain
bounds to military integration between the participating States which must be
taken into account in the interest of a common solution.
The question remains open as to what extent the concept of multinational
units, which is unique in Europe today, will gain importance beyond present
Alliance cooperation. Most current UN peacekeeping operations have long
been multinational in nature. It is sometimes surprising to see that certain gen,
eral rules which have become routine for NATO cooperation, in particular
with respect to command and control, are still absent during UN operations.
The practice of ad hoc arrangements may still be preferable to allow for flexibil,
ity in a specific mission, but clarity, consistency and, last but not least, the prin'
ciple of equality between troop contributing States require a long' term solution
based on accepted general terms and procedures.
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In all aspects of multinational military units, the need for a continuous review is obvious. It is highlighted by the review process agreed to in the treaties,
as well as by the common interest of all negotiating partners in using well-tried
procedures and developing tailor-made solutions.
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